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The Economic Nature of the Firm
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Overview
This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.
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Professional Reviews
Table Of Contents
| Preface: reintroducing the economic nature of the firm | |
| Within and Among Firms: The Division of Labor | |
| From The Wealth of Nations | |
| From Capital | |
| From Risk, Uncertainty and Profit | |
| From The Modern Corporation and Private Property | |
| The use of knowledge in society | |
| Corporate governance | |
| The Nature of the Firm | |
| The nature of the firmvRonald Coase | |
| Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process | |
| The governance of contractual relations | |
| The limits of firms: incentive and bureaucratic features | |
| Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity | |
| The boundaries of the firm revisited Bengt Holmstrom | |
| The Employment Relation, the Human Factor and Internal Organization | |
| Production, information costs, and economic organization | |
| Contested exchange; new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalismvSamuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis | |
| Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange | |
| Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design | |
| Work motivation | |
| From Worker Participation | |
| Finance and the Control of the Firm | |
| Mergers and the market for corporate control | |
| Agency problems and the theory of the firm | |
| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure | |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions | |
| The rise in managerial stock ownership | |
| Executive compensation as an agency problem | |
| An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm | |
| Ownership and the nature of the firm | |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
| Find at your local library from our friends at WorldCat | Find Libraries |
Overview
This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holm ...
Read full overview
Overview
This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.
Product Details
Professional Reviews
Table Of Contents
| Preface: reintroducing the economic nature of the firm | |
| Within and Among Firms: The Division of Labor | |
| From The Wealth of Nations | |
| From Capital | |
| From Risk, Uncertainty and Profit | |
| From The Modern Corporation and Private Property | |
| The use of knowledge in society | |
| Corporate governance | |
| The Nature of the Firm | |
| The nature of the firmvRonald Coase | |
| Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process | |
| The governance of contractual relations | |
| The limits of firms: incentive and bureaucratic features | |
| Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity | |
| The boundaries of the firm revisited Bengt Holmstrom | |
| The Employment Relation, the Human Factor and Internal Organization | |
| Production, information costs, and economic organization | |
| Contested exchange; new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalismvSamuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis | |
| Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange | |
| Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design | |
| Work motivation | |
| From Worker Participation | |
| Finance and the Control of the Firm | |
| Mergers and the market for corporate control | |
| Agency problems and the theory of the firm | |
| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure | |
| Organizational forms and investment decisions | |
| The rise in managerial stock ownership | |
| Executive compensation as an agency problem | |
| An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm | |
| Ownership and the nature of the firm | |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
All Available Copies
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Digital edition from eBooks.com | {{ebooksDotComPrice}} {{ebooksDotComCurrency}} | eBooks.com |
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Audio Book Obtain a digital book from our friends at AudiobooksNow.com.
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