Conceptions of Truth

Name: Conceptions of Truth
Author: Wolfgang Künne
ISBN: 9780199280193

by Wolfgang Künne

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Conceptions of Truth

by Wolfgang Künne

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Overview

Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Künne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories, from Aristotle to the present day. He argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars.

FormatPerfect

LanguageEnglish

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

Publication DateAug. 18th, 2005

ISBN-139780199280193

Dimensions6.14 x 9.21 x 1.09 inches

ISBN-100199280193

Shipping Weight1.76 lbs

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Professional Reviews

'... thorough, clear, and well-argued . . . In its scope and clarity the book should rightly become the standard text for an introductory graduate seminar on truth. Anyone new to the topic will do well to turn to it, and the expert will benefit both from Kunne's setting of the issues and fromhis detailed contributions ... I recommend Conceptions of Truth most highly.'Douglas Patterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Some Questions about Truth	p. 1
A Bogus Predicate?	p. 33
Frege's Identity Thesis	p. 34
Redundancy and omnipresence	p. 34
An internal conflict within Frege's theory?	p. 37
Conditions of propositional identity	p. 42
Who is right, Frege or Bolzano?	p. 48
Two kinds of truth talk	p. 52
Truth-Theoretical Nihilism	p. 53
The performative potential of 'true'	p. 56
Introducing 'somewhether' and 'thether'	p. 64
'True' as a syncategorematic expression	p. 77
'Is True' as a prosentence-forming operator	p. 84
A Real Predicate, After All	p. 87
Varieties of Correspondence	p. 93
Classical Correspondence	p. 94
From Aristotle to Aquinas	p. 95
Interlude: non-propositional truth	p. 104
Variants and limits of the Aristotelian conception	p. 107
Cambridge Correspondence	p. 112
Moorean prodigality	p. 114
Logical atomist parsimony	p. 118
A Battery of Objections	p. 126
The comparison objection	p. 126
The treadmill	p. 129
The spectre of fact monism	p. 133
The unworldliness objection	p. 141
A Neglected Alternative	p. 145
Varieties of Making True	p. 148
Aristotle and the Principle C	p. 150
A propositional reading of 'making true'	p. 154
An ontic reading of 'making true'	p. 158
Another propositional reading	p. 165
Correspondence and alethic realism	p. 169
In and Out of Quotation Marks	p. 175
The Semantic Conception	p. 175
Preliminaries on 'semantic'	p. 176
Formal correctness and material adequacy	p. 180
Three Tarskian truth-definitions	p. 192
Recalcitrant features of natural languages	p. 202
Explanatory ambitions	p. 208
Explanatory success?	p. 217
Disquotationalist Conceptions	p. 225
Redundancy again	p. 226
Truth for the sake of brevity	p. 237
Truth in my present idiolect	p. 242
Propositions, Time, and Eternity	p. 249
What Is It that Is True or False?	p. 249
Introducing 'proposition'	p. 249
Contents and (intentional) objects	p. 258
More on truth-value bearers	p. 263
Eternalism	p. 269
A first division in the eternalist camp	p. 270
A critique of eliminativist eternalism	p. 272
An alleged metaphysical vindication of eternalism	p. 281
Further divisions in the eternalist camp	p. 285
Temporalism	p. 295
Who is afraid of temporally indeterminate propositions?	p. 295
Over-hasty arguments for temporalism	p. 306
Limits of temporalism	p. 308
An Irenic Epilogue	p. 313
Two Pleas for Modesty	p. 317
Minimalism	p. 318
Clinging to the denominalization schema	p. 318
A denial of intelligibility	p. 327
Modest enough?	p. 331
A Modest Account of Truth	p. 333
Exposition	p. 333
A new theory?	p. 339
Questions, objections, and rejoinders	p. 350
Truth and Justifiability	p. 375
Classical Versions of Alethic Anti-Realism	p. 375
Foundationalism	p. 375
Coherentism	p. 381
Consensualism	p. 393
'A Long Journey from Realism back to Realism'	p. 404
'Idealized' rational acceptability	p. 406
Kindred constraints	p. 416
Reasons for recantation	p. 419
Limits of Justifiability	p. 424
Anonym's argument	p. 425
An example under hermeneutical pressure	p. 430
The argument from justification blindspots	p. 437
Attempts at answering the challenge	p. 443
The priority of justification	p. 449
Against alethic pluralism	p. 452
Bibliography	p. 455
Name Index	p. 481
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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Overview

Product Details

FormatPerfect

LanguageEnglish

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

Publication DateAug. 18th, 2005

ISBN-139780199280193

Dimensions6.14 x 9.21 x 1.09 inches

ISBN-100199280193

Shipping Weight1.76 lbs

Professional Reviews

Some Questions about Truth	p. 1
A Bogus Predicate?	p. 33
Frege's Identity Thesis	p. 34
Redundancy and omnipresence	p. 34
An internal conflict within Frege's theory?	p. 37
Conditions of propositional identity	p. 42
Who is right, Frege or Bolzano?	p. 48
Two kinds of truth talk	p. 52
Truth-Theoretical Nihilism	p. 53
The performative potential of 'true'	p. 56
Introducing 'somewhether' and 'thether'	p. 64
'True' as a syncategorematic expression	p. 77
'Is True' as a prosentence-forming operator	p. 84
A Real Predicate, After All	p. 87
Varieties of Correspondence	p. 93
Classical Correspondence	p. 94
From Aristotle to Aquinas	p. 95
Interlude: non-propositional truth	p. 104
Variants and limits of the Aristotelian conception	p. 107
Cambridge Correspondence	p. 112
Moorean prodigality	p. 114
Logical atomist parsimony	p. 118
A Battery of Objections	p. 126
The comparison objection	p. 126
The treadmill	p. 129
The spectre of fact monism	p. 133
The unworldliness objection	p. 141
A Neglected Alternative	p. 145
Varieties of Making True	p. 148
Aristotle and the Principle C	p. 150
A propositional reading of 'making true'	p. 154
An ontic reading of 'making true'	p. 158
Another propositional reading	p. 165
Correspondence and alethic realism	p. 169
In and Out of Quotation Marks	p. 175
The Semantic Conception	p. 175
Preliminaries on 'semantic'	p. 176
Formal correctness and material adequacy	p. 180
Three Tarskian truth-definitions	p. 192
Recalcitrant features of natural languages	p. 202
Explanatory ambitions	p. 208
Explanatory success?	p. 217
Disquotationalist Conceptions	p. 225
Redundancy again	p. 226
Truth for the sake of brevity	p. 237
Truth in my present idiolect	p. 242
Propositions, Time, and Eternity	p. 249
What Is It that Is True or False?	p. 249
Introducing 'proposition'	p. 249
Contents and (intentional) objects	p. 258
More on truth-value bearers	p. 263
Eternalism	p. 269
A first division in the eternalist camp	p. 270
A critique of eliminativist eternalism	p. 272
An alleged metaphysical vindication of eternalism	p. 281
Further divisions in the eternalist camp	p. 285
Temporalism	p. 295
Who is afraid of temporally indeterminate propositions?	p. 295
Over-hasty arguments for temporalism	p. 306
Limits of temporalism	p. 308
An Irenic Epilogue	p. 313
Two Pleas for Modesty	p. 317
Minimalism	p. 318
Clinging to the denominalization schema	p. 318
A denial of intelligibility	p. 327
Modest enough?	p. 331
A Modest Account of Truth	p. 333
Exposition	p. 333
A new theory?	p. 339
Questions, objections, and rejoinders	p. 350
Truth and Justifiability	p. 375
Classical Versions of Alethic Anti-Realism	p. 375
Foundationalism	p. 375
Coherentism	p. 381
Consensualism	p. 393
'A Long Journey from Realism back to Realism'	p. 404
'Idealized' rational acceptability	p. 406
Kindred constraints	p. 416
Reasons for recantation	p. 419
Limits of Justifiability	p. 424
Anonym's argument	p. 425
An example under hermeneutical pressure	p. 430
The argument from justification blindspots	p. 437
Attempts at answering the challenge	p. 443
The priority of justification	p. 449
Against alethic pluralism	p. 452
Bibliography	p. 455
Name Index	p. 481
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Conceptions of Truth

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Conceptions of Truth

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Table Of Contents

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Table Of Contents

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